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AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,
MANAGERIAL CORPORATE
CAPITALISM, AND THE INSTITUTIONAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE MODERN
INCOME TAX
AJAY K. MEHROTRA*
I
INTRODUCTION
1909 was a critical turning point in the development of American tax law
and policy. In that year, Congress enacted a national corporate tax at the same
time that it introduced a constitutional amendment permitting a federal
personal-income tax.1 The corporate tax, which was framed as a “special excise
tax” on the privilege of doing business, had an immediate, albeit modest, impact
on federal revenues, accounting for nearly $21 million of the $289 million of
total internal revenue for fiscal year 1910.2 The constitutional amendment, by
contrast, languished in the halls of state legislatures for several years before it
was finally ratified in 1913. Once it was adopted, the Sixteenth Amendment
nullified the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1895 invalidation of the nation’s first

Copyright © 2009 by Ajay K. Mehrotra.
This Article is also available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/lcp.
* Professor of Law & Louis F. Niezer Faculty Fellow, Adjunct Associate Professor of History,
Indiana University Maurer School of Law–Bloomington. For their comments and suggestions, I would
like to thank Anne Alstott, Steve Bank, Charlotte Crane, Ken Dau-Schmidt, David Galenson, Leandra
Lederman, Isaac Martin, Bill Popkin, Larry Ribstein, Joel Slemrod, Jeff Stake, Joe Thorndike, and
Dennis Ventry. In addition to the Law and Contemporary Problems conference, an earlier version of
this article was presented at the Midwest Law and Economics Association’s annual conference. I would
like to thank participants at those conferences for their assistance. I would also like to thank Collin
McCready for his outstanding research, and the editors and staff of Law and Contemporary Problems
for their detailed and thorough editing. Thanks also to Larry Zelenak and Rich Schmalbeck for
initiating this conference volume. Research for this article was generously supported by an I.U. Maurer
School of Law Summer Grant.
1. Corporation Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 61-5, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112 (1909); S.J. Res. 40, 61st Cong.
(1909). President William Howard Taft proposed the corporate tax and the constitutional amendment
in June 1909. S. DOC. NO. 61-98 (1909).
2. SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF
THE TREASURY ON THE STATE OF THE FINANCES FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1910, at 26, 31,
453 (1911).
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peacetime national income tax3 and paved the way for the subsequent
development of the modern American income tax.
Although the corporate tax and the constitutional amendment were
presented together in 1909, the amendment garnered much greater attention
among contemporary commentators and modern scholars. And for good
reason. Ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment had far-reaching
consequences for American law and political economy. It not only overturned
the most serious legal obstacle to the adoption of graduated individual-income
taxes, it also emboldened social groups and political reformers to demand the
first permanent federal income tax, which was enacted within a year of the
amendment’s ratification.4
Yet the corporate tax may have played an equally important, though more
subtle, role in American political and economic development. Together with
the personal-income tax, the corporate levy helped generate substantial
government revenue throughout the twentieth century—revenue that has been
critical to the growth of the public sector.5 Despite the uncertain incidence of
the corporate tax, some scholars and commentators have also depicted it as an
effective regulatory tool used to curb the abuses and increasing power of Big
Business.6 As a result of these dual functions of raising revenue and regulating
economic power, many historically minded scholars have tended to subsume the
corporate levy as part of the Progressive Era’s overall tax reforms. The
Sixteenth Amendment, the personal-income tax, and the corporate tax are thus
all frequently viewed as part and parcel of one grand narrative in which the
social and political demands for greater tax equity are the key determinants of
the dramatic, early-twentieth-century transformation in American tax law and
policy.7
A singular focus, however, on social and political factors, especially one that
subordinates the corporate tax to a minor role, provides only a partial account
of the history of the modern American income tax. This article offers a broader
3. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 586, modified on reh’g, 158 U.S. 601
(1895).
4. Tariff of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, § 2, 38 Stat. 114, 166 (1913). For more on the ratification
process and why the corporate tax and the constitutional amendment were packaged together as part of
a political compromise, see JOHN D. BUENKER, THE INCOME TAX AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 55–59
(1986).
5. Like the personal-income tax, the corporate tax initially raised a relatively small amount of
revenue, until the mid-1940s, when corporate-tax revenues peaked and accounted for nearly 7% of
gross domestic product (GDP). Since the 1950s, however, corporate-tax revenues have diminished
steadily, hovering in the low single digits as a percentage of GDP. JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA,
TAXING OURSELVES 22–23 (2007); Alan J. Auerbach, Corporate Taxation in the United States, 2:1983
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 451, 453 (1983).
6. See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the State: A Defense of the
Corporate Tax, 90 VA. L. REV. 1193 (2004); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the
Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53 (1990). For a contrasting view of the origins of the
corporate tax, see generally Steven A. Bank, Entity Theory as Myth in the Origins of the Corporate
Income Tax, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447 (2001).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 17–29.
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explanation by moving beyond the social and political determinants to ask,
What were the economic forces that facilitated the adoption of the modern
graduated income tax? How did these economic factors shape the institutional
framework that gave rise to direct and graduated taxes? And what role, if any,
did the early corporate tax play in the creation and elaboration of the modern
U.S. income tax?
This article investigates two particular economic factors. First, it explores
the broad, long-term, structural transformations in the American economy that
fostered the development of the modern progressive income tax. Between the
end of Reconstruction and the onset of the Great Depression, the American
economy underwent dramatic changes. Mass migration, rapid urbanization and
industrialization, and tremendous economic growth transformed what was by
most accounts a peripheral New World republic into a geopolitical and
economic power.8 These structural changes had important ramifications for
American public finance. As the pace of urban–industrial capitalism
accelerated, an increasing amount of output and income moved through the
market, mainly because of the actions of large-scale industrial corporations. The
expansion of the market as an institution, and the concomitant growth in cash
transactions, were thus critical to the evolution of the modern income tax.
Because the market’s cash nexus permitted more and more individuals to derive
a greater portion of their income and wealth from the sale of their labor
services or the deployment of their physical and financial capital, lawmakers
were able to more easily measure and tap the growing tax base. Consequently,
the national tax structure began to shift away from a reliance on indirect levies,
namely import duties and excise taxes on alcohol and tobacco, toward moredirect and graduated taxes on income and wealth transfers.
The second set of economic factors that facilitated the development of the
modern income tax followed from the first. The structural transformations in
the American economy prompted more-specific changes in economic
organizations and administrative procedures that gave government authorities
new “tax handles” with which to assess and collect personal and business
income.9 As income and economic power became concentrated in larger
organizational units, namely integrated, multi-unit business corporations, it
became easier to identify and access sources of tax revenue.10 Moreover, these

8. See generally MICHAEL H. HUNT, THE AMERICAN ASCENDANCY: HOW THE UNITED STATES
GAINED AND WIELDED GLOBAL DOMINANCE (2007).
9. The term “tax handles” is generally associated with the work of early developmental
economists. See, e.g., RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, FISCAL SYSTEMS 125 (1969); Harley H. Hinrichs,
Determinants of Government Revenue Shares Among Less-Developed Countries, 75 ECON. J. 546, 546
(1965). One of the aims of this article is to apply the findings of the literature on development and tax
structure to the American historical context.
10. Though scholars have identified large business corporations as crucial intermediaries in the taxcollection process, they have generally viewed their contribution as coming during the second half of
the twentieth century. See, e.g., W. Elliot Brownlee, Taxation in the U.S. During World War I:
Alternatives and Legacies, in TAXATION, STATE, AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED
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new, colossal organizations implemented more-rational and routinized systems
of accounting to accurately calculate their profits and investment returns.
Rational calculation is, after all, one of the institutional hallmarks of modern
capitalism.11 Although such advanced and systematic computations were
frequently undertaken to measure internal production and distribution
efficiencies and to attract additional finance capital, these innovations in
gathering and processing information also helped tax authorities by reducing
the costs of tax collection. As U.S. Treasury officials experimented with early
forms of tax withholding, the accounting and recordkeeping of large businesses
proved invaluable. Over time, the enactment of steeply progressive tax laws
that tapped rising business profits and personal incomes reinforced the need for
more-accurate recordkeeping and led to even more-standardized taxaccounting systems.
There was perhaps no greater marker and enabler of these economic trends
than the rise of the large-scale, hierarchically managed, industrial corporation,
or what business historians have referred to as the advent of American
managerial capitalism.12 The modern business corporation, complete with
distinct organizational units run by salaried executives, was both a product of
the broader, turn-of-the-century structural changes in the U.S. economy, and an
embodiment of the new types of economic organizations and administrative
processes. Accordingly, the early national attempt to tax corporations was
important for American economic and political development not only because
of its revenue-raising or regulatory potential, but also because it was
representative of the dramatic changes in the U.S. economy and of the
organizational units contained within it. In this sense, the historical significance
of corporate taxation rests as much with what it stood for as with what it did.
And what it stood for was the notion that the ongoing process of American
economic growth was providing national policymakers with new opportunities
to transform the U.S. tax system.
Current public-finance scholars have certainly recognized the central role of
business corporations in the tax-collection process. As one leading scholar of
taxation and development has written, “The key to effective taxation is
information, and the key to information in the modern economy is the
corporation. . . . The corporation is thus the modern fiscal state’s equivalent of

STATES FROM THE 18TH TO THE 20TH CENTURY 83, 96 (Alexander Nützenadel & Christoph Strupp
eds., 2007).
11. Max Weber, Sociological Categories of Economic Action, in ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN
OUTLINE OF INTERPRETATIVE SOCIOLOGY 63, 90–92 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978).
12. See generally DAVID BUNTING, THE RISE OF LARGE AMERICAN CORPORATIONS, 1889–1919
(1987); ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977); LOUIS GALAMBOS, THE PUBLIC IMAGE OF BIG BUSINESS IN AMERICA,
1880–1940 (1975); MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN
CAPITALISM, 1890–1916 (1988).
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the customs barrier at the border.”13 This article synthesizes the public-finance
literature on taxation and economic development with findings from U.S.
economic and business history to explain how American economic development
and the emergence of managerial corporate capitalism helped create the pivotal
institutional foundations for the modern income tax.14
In focusing on the economic conditions that paved the way for the income
tax, this article does not contend that social and political factors were negligible
or that economic growth inexorably determines changes in tax systems. Political
interests and social turmoil were not exogenous variables. Rather, as publicfinance scholars have long noted,15 and a new wave of interdisciplinary
scholarship has emphasized,16 social and political forces—not to mention
cultural influences—have worked in concert with economic factors in shaping
tax systems across place and time.17 The central aim of this article is to make a
modest contribution to the legal and political historiography of the U.S. income
tax by highlighting how changing material economic conditions afforded social
groups, political reformers, and lawmakers a unique, historically contingent
opportunity to transform the American tax system.
Because social and political forces did, in fact, play an important role, this
article begins, in part II, with a brief recapitulation of the standard sociopolitical
accounts of the formation of the American income tax. It then turns in part III
to a macro-level analysis of American economic development at the turn of the
twentieth century. Using some conventional economic metrics, part III shows
how the United States was gradually transformed from a mid-nineteenthcentury “developing” nation into the world’s leading industrial power by the
start of World War I. Part IV focuses more specifically on how economic
growth led to structural changes in the economy—changes that signaled the rise
of a new form of capitalism in which salaried business executives employed
innovative techniques to manage the processes of mass production and
distribution. Part V shows how economic growth and the rise of managerial
corporate capitalism helped establish the institutional framework that
facilitated the development of the modern income tax. The article concludes in

13. Richard M. Bird, Why Tax Corporations?, 56 BULL. FOR INT’L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 194,
199 (2002).
14. This article uses the terms “institution” and “institutional” broadly to refer to what Douglass
North has suggested are the “humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.” DOUGLASS
C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 3 (1990).
15. See generally MUSGRAVE, supra note 9; Hinrichs, supra note 9.
16. See generally THE NEW FISCAL SOCIOLOGY: TAXATION IN COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE (Isaac William Martin, Ajay K. Mehrotra & Monica Prasad eds., 2009).
17. For more on the recent literature on economic development and tax structure, see generally
Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt, Redistribution via Taxation: The Limited Role of the Personal Income
Tax in Developing Countries, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1627 (2005); Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt, Tax
Policy in Emerging Countries, 26 ENV’T & PLAN. C: GOV’T & POL’Y 73 (2008), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1307861; Robin Burgess & Nicolas Stern, Taxation and
Development, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE 762 (1993); Vito Tanzi & Howell H. Zee, Tax Policy for
Emerging Markets: Developing Nations, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 299 (2000).
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part VI with some closing remarks summarizing how American economic
development and managerial corporate capitalism helped create the
institutional foundations of the modern American income tax.
II
THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF
THE MODERN INCOME TAX
Historians of American public finance who have explored the beginnings of
the modern income tax have frequently disagreed about its ultimate impact, but
nearly all have privileged the explanatory power of political actors and
institutions, as well as the social forces calling for tax reform. From the latenineteenth-century populist demands for graduated income and wealth taxes to
the political backlash against the Supreme Court’s decision in Pollock v.
Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co.18 to the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment
and the enactment of subsequent income-tax laws, the key historical agents in
most conventional accounts have been the lower agrarian and laboring classes,
and the politicians and lawmakers who have either fought on behalf of these
producers or blunted their demands by siding with powerful business and
economic interests. Although some scholars have paid passing reference to
“stage[s] of economic development,”19 the fundamental drivers of historical
change have been the social tensions between classes and the mediating role
played by politics, especially during national emergencies such as wars and
economic dislocations.20
For an older generation of mainly economic and legal historians weaned on
the politics of New Deal liberalism, the history of the income tax was very much
a morality tale in which the forces of social democracy gradually triumphed
over plutocracy. Written mainly as prologues for the victorious arrival of
Franklin D. Roosevelt, these teleological interpretations left little doubt that
progressive lawmakers were critical to the formation of a new fiscal order. With
the leadership of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, and their
congressional allies, fundamental tax reform was not only possible, it seemed
preordained. For this older generation of scholars American fiscal history could
not be separated from the populist demands of farmers and workers or the
progressive political leaders who led the movement for tax reform.21
Whereas these progressive historians equated early-twentieth-century tax
reform with the triumphalism of American liberal democracy, a later generation
of scholars from both the political left and right inverted the earlier narrative.
The earlier generation celebrated the graduated income tax as a signal

18.
19.
20.
21.

157 U.S. 429 (1895).
SIDNEY RATNER, TAXATION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 9 (1967).
See generally W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA (1996).
See generally ROY G. BLAKEY & GLADYS C. BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX (1940);
RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1954); RATNER, supra note 19.
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achievement for American social democracy, but the new group of corporateliberal and neoconservative scholars contended that U.S. political institutions
and actors could not be trusted to fulfill the will of the populace. Thus,
corporate-liberal scholars from the left argued that the income tax was a hollow
victory, a subtle and sophisticated form of conservatism, a clever plot to
domesticate potentially more-radical forms of wealth redistribution.22
Neoconservative scholars, using public-choice theory, agreed that the state had
been captured, not by centrist capitalists, but by special economic interests who
exploited the rent-seeking behavior of corrupt politicians.23 Others attached a
similar negative connotation to the history of the American income tax; but
rather than single out the machinations of political actors, these scholars
focused on how the pluralism of American politics and the incrementalism of
political change doomed the United States to a dysfunctional income-tax
system.24
In recent years, the historical literature on American tax policy has reflected
a type of revival of the earlier progressive view, but one that is more attuned to
historical contingency and the interactions between institutions and individual
agents. Not only has this neoprogressive view informed a robust debate about
the constitutional history surrounding the income tax,25 and the importance of
modern industrialization,26 it has also led to a new “democratic institutionalist”
model of American fiscal history that reemphasizes the relative autonomy of
state power and the use of that power in the search for tax equity and social
justice.27

22. See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960,
at 19–27 (1992); ROBERT STANLEY, THE DIMENSIONS OF LAW IN THE SERVICE OF ORDER: ORIGINS
OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX, 1861–1913 (1993). Other New Left interpretations have extended this
analysis into later twentieth-century U.S. tax history. See, e.g., MARK LEFF, THE LIMITS OF SYMBOLIC
REFORM: THE NEW DEAL AND TAXATION, 1933–1939 (1984); JAMES O’CONNOR, THE FISCAL CRISIS
OF THE STATE (1973).
23. See generally ROBERT HIGGS, CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN: CRITICAL EPISODES IN THE GROWTH
OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1987); Bennett D. Baack & Edward John Ray, Special Interests and the
Adoption of the Income Tax in the United States, 45 J. ECON. HIST. 607 (1985).
24. See generally SHELDON D. POLLACK, THE FAILURE OF U.S. TAX POLICY (1996); JOHN F.
WITTE, POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX (1985). For a comparative
perspective on the limits of U.S. tax policy, see generally SVEN STEINMO, TAXATION & DEMOCRACY
(1993).
25. For a sampling of the vast literature on the constitutional foundations of the income tax, see
generally MAX M. EDLING, A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT (2003); CALVIN H.
JOHNSON, RIGHTEOUS ANGER AT THE WICKED STATES (2005); Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the
Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1999); Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment of “Direct” Taxes: Are
Consumption Taxes Constitutional?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2334 (1997); Leo P. Martinez, “To Lay and
Collect Taxes”: The Constitutional Case for Progressive Taxation, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 111 (1999).
26. See generally Kimberly J. Morgan & Monica Prasad, The Origins of Tax Systems: A FrenchAmerican Comparison, 114 AMER. J. SOC. 1350 (2009).
27. See generally BROWNLEE, supra note 20; STEVEN R. WEISMAN, THE GREAT TAX WARS
(2002); TAX JUSTICE (Joseph J. Thorndike & Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., eds., 2002). In reviving the earlier
progressive interpretation of the beginnings of the income tax, more-recent scholars have also provided
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Despite the stark scholarly differences over the ultimate meaning of
Progressive Era tax reform, what unites these contending interpretations is an
unwavering focus on politics, political institutions, and social tensions as the
engines of historical change. Even those who examine big-picture changes focus
on the political response to industrialization and central state authority.28 As
one leading historian has explained,
[N]o complex of economic factors, narrowly defined, can explain the centralization of
government, the shifts in government functions, and changes in the structure of public
finance. Explanation of the transitions must rest more heavily on an understanding of
fundamental shifts in civic values, bound up in the workings of politics and political
29
institutions, within the context of externally driven social crises.

The workings of politics, political institutions, and social crises certainly go a
long way in explaining early-twentieth-century American tax reform. Massive
social unrest, changing ideological perceptions, and shifting political power, as
well as national emergencies, were all salient features in the development of the
modern American income tax, as many of the other articles in this issue
illustrate. But complex economic factors, broadly defined, had an equally
significant influence. Whether one sees American economic growth as a
prerequisite to the ultimate impact of political and social forces,30 or whether
one describes economic development and material changes as working
endogenously alongside and in unison with political ideology and social
tensions, there is little doubt that the long-term process of American economic
development had a resounding impact on the U.S. tax system. To understand
the interaction among economic, political, and social forces, it may be useful to
first summarize just how the United States progressed from a mid-nineteenthcentury “developing” nation to the world’s largest industrial power by the end
of World War I.
III
FROM “DEVELOPING” NATION TO WORLD POWER: AMERICAN ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT AT THE TURN OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
During the long nineteenth century, the United States experienced
tremendous economic growth. Because the economy generated a standard of
strong empirical evidence from congressional roll-call votes to show how lawmakers from agrarian
districts supported income taxes. See ELIZABETH SANDERS, ROOTS OF REFORM 226–32 (1999).
28. See generally Morgan & Prasad, supra note 26. European political historians seem to be more
attuned to the salience of economic factors in the development of fiscal policies. See, e.g., MARTIN
DAUNTON, TRUSTING LEVIATHAN 14–16 (2001). See generally THE RISE OF THE FISCAL STATE IN
EUROPE C. 1200–1815 (Richard Bonney ed., 2004).
29. W. Elliot Brownlee, The Public Sector, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES: THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 1013, 1017 (Stanley L. Engerman & Robert E. Gallman
eds., 2000).
30. Richard Musgrave contended that economic growth provided lawmakers with greater
flexibility in policy choices, and thus, by implication, fundamental and structural economic changes
chronologically preceded the influence of social and political factors. MUSGRAVE, supra note 9, at 125–
67.
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living that was relatively high, though uneven, the country could hardly be
described as a “developing” nation by most present-day measures.31 To do so
would belittle the challenges that continue to plague lesser developed countries
today. Still, the United States did not become an international industrial power
overnight. Economic growth and development, driven by an abundance of
natural resources, technological innovation, and increasing factor inputs and
productivity, helped transform an agriculturally based, seaboard economy into
the world’s leading industrial, capitalist economy by the second decade of the
twentieth century.32 Well before Henry Luce famously and bombastically
predicted the triumphant arrival of the “American Century,” the United States
was fast becoming the world’s leading economic power.33 The process of
industrialization, which accelerated during the decades that straddled the turn
of the twentieth century, was particularly important in shaping the institutional
foundations of the modern income tax.
From a comparative-historical perspective, the U.S. economy by the late
nineteenth century had already achieved great success and was poised to
become an international leader due in part to a unique array of material,
technological, and natural-resource-based circumstances. Although precise
historical comparisons across space and time, as scholars have noted, can be
problematic,34 by most estimates, the United States by the 1870s had a large and
rapidly growing economy. At that time, American per capita real-income levels
were already among the highest in the world.35 The United States, for example,
far outpaced countries like Russia, where average real income was about onehalf the American level, and even leading European colonial powers such as
France and Germany had per capita real GDP figures that were roughly threefourths of U.S. levels.36
Nonetheless, the United States was not the world’s dominant economy
during the late nineteenth century. It not only lagged behind the United
Kingdom—which had real per capita income levels in the 1870s that were about
31. Using a broad, structural perspective, some political historians have described the United
States as a developing nation at the turn of the twentieth century because American politics has been a
“function of the stages of development of a market society.” MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE UNITED STATES
AS A DEVELOPING COUNTRY 19 (1992).
32. For a succinct summary of American economic growth during this period, see generally Robert
E. Gallman, Economic Growth and Structural Change in the Long Nineteenth Century, in THE
CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY, supra note 29, at 1; Kenneth L. Sokoloff & Stanley L. Engermann,
History Lessons: Institutions, Factor Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World, 14 J.
ECON. PERSP. 217 (2000); Gavin Wright, The Origins of American Industrial Success, 1879–1940, 80
AM. ECON. REV. 651 (1990).
33. See generally HENRY R. LUCE, THE AMERICAN CENTURY (1941).
34. ANGUS MADDISON, DYNAMIC FORCES IN CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT 195–201 (1991).
Despite several shortcomings, per capita real output can be a crude and imperfect proxy for economic
success. For the purposes of measuring how economic growth facilitated the development of the
income tax, the measure of market output and income may be particularly useful. On the limits of using
per capita output measures, see generally SIMON KUZNETS, ECONOMIC CHANGE 145–91 (1953).
35. ANGUS MADDISON, MONITORING THE WORLD ECONOMY, 1820–1992, at 194–206 (1995).
36. Gallman, supra note 32, at 20.
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30% greater than the United States—and other relatively small European
dynamos like the Netherlands; the United States also trailed the colonial
economies of Australia and New Zealand, which, with their small populations,
copious natural resources, and large infusions of European capital, had greater
real per capita income throughout the last decades of the nineteenth century.37
By 1870, the United States was still far ahead of the leading economies of Asia
(Indonesia) and Latin America (Argentina), but it was gaining on global
leaders in terms of economic performance.38
Chart 1. Real GDP per Capita, 1870–193039
7,000

UK
6,000

Argentina
Indonesia

5,000

US

GDP

4,000

Netherlands

3,000

Australia
2,000
1,000
1870

1880

1890

1900

1910

1920

1930

Year

It did not take long, however, for the United States to surpass the United
Kingdom and all other nations in terms of economic growth. The annual growth
rate of American real per capita income during the turn of the century outpaced
nearly all other nations, with the notable exception of Argentina, which
witnessed unprecedented growth rates due mainly to the productivity of fertile
land, the export of agricultural goods, and the subsequent investment of
European capital.40 Whereas average real income in the United Kingdom grew
at an annual rate of roughly 1% between 1870 and 1930, the United States
experienced a 2.6% annual growth rate over the same period.41 Moreover, as the
use of per capita–series rather than aggregate-output data shows, the last third
37. In 1870, U.S. real GDP per capita was roughly $2457 (in 1990 Geary–Khamis dollars), far
below estimates for the United Kingdom ($3263) and Australia ($3801). MADDISON, supra note 35, at
194–96.
38. See infra Chart 1.
39. MADDISON, supra note 35, at 194–206.
40. ROBERTO CORTÉS CONDE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ARGENTINA IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 14–39 (2009). For more on Argentina’s late-nineteenth-century exceptional economic
growth and then its subsequent late-twentieth-century decline, see generally A NEW ECONOMIC
HISTORY OF ARGENTINA (Gerardo della Paolera & Alan M. Taylor eds., 2003).
41. See infra Table A.
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of the nineteenth century was a particularly pronounced era of American
economic development compared to other nations and past periods.42
Technological innovations as well as increased productivity of input factors,
particularly capital, led to a modern period of industrialization that was at the
center of American per capita–output growth.43 Those who benefited most from
these economic gains, namely investors, manufacturers, merchants, and
business managers, would soon become the leading sources of income-tax
revenue.
Table A
Average Annual Real GDP Growth per Capita, 1870–193044

United States
United Kingdom
Netherlands
Australia
Argentina
Indonesia

1870–1900
2.2%
1.4%
1.1%
0.4%
3.7%
0.4%

1900–1930
1.7%
0.4%
1.8%
0.4%
1.6%
2.0%

1870–1930
2.6%
1.0%
1.8%
0.4%
3.5%
1.4%

Because of the rapid surge in economic growth at the turn of the century,
the United States emerged as the world’s leading economy by the 1920s. Well
before then, contemporaries could foresee the coming dominance of American
economic might. As one British journalist noted in 1901, “The most serious
aspect of the American industrial invasion lies in the fact that these newcomers
have acquired control of almost every new industry created during the past
fifteen years.” After rattling off a long list of modern devices, including “the
telephone, the portable camera, the phonograph, the electric street car, the
automobile,” and “the typewriter,” the English writer concluded that “in every
one of these . . . the American maker is supreme; in several he is a
monopolist.”45 Comparative historical data corroborates these remarks. By the
end of World War I, average real income in the United States was nearly 20%

42. Using real, per capita, gross national product figures, Robert Gallman has estimated that the
American economy grew by an annual rate of 2.4% between 1869 and 1909, far greater than in any
other prior long-term period. Gallman, supra note 32, at 22.
43. JOHN W. KENDRICK, PRODUCTIVITY TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 464 (1961); Paul
Bairoch, International Industrialization Levels from 1750–1980, 11 J. EUR. ECON. HIST. 269, 297 (1982).
44. MADDISON, supra note 35, at 194–206.
45. FREDERICK ARTHUR MCKENZIE, THE AMERICAN INVADERS 31 (1901).

MEHROTRA

36

9/4/2010 11:12:25 AM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 73:25

greater than in the United Kingdom, and almost 10% greater than in
Australia.46
American labor and capital productivity at the turn of the century
transformed the country into the world’s largest producer of goods and services.
In fact, even before the start of the Great War, “[a]ggregate annual output was
greater in the United States than in the three main World War I belligerents—
the United Kingdom, Germany, and France—combined.”47 With an increasing
proportion of output moving through the market, the potential income-tax base
grew significantly. In addition, as the industrial economy shifted from a
structure of entrepreneurial capitalism to corporate capitalism, characterized by
larger organizational units of production and distribution, government tax
authorities were able to collect taxes more easily.
Economic output was not the only way in which the United States created
the critical mass that facilitated the base for modern income taxation. By many
other measures of modern development, the United States also made great
strides at the turn of the century. Average life expectancy increased, infant
mortality declined,48 and education levels rose sharply.49 These changes led to a
healthier and more educated workforce that would soon come to occupy pivotal
positions in the development of the modern income tax. Skilled employees were
fast becoming the salaried managers of the burgeoning new industrial
corporations. An increasing number of service professionals, such as doctors
and lawyers, were also earning greater market incomes that could be tapped by
the new tax regime.50 And there was a growing number of capital owners and
investors who were profiting from American industrialization.51 In time, each of
these groups would be among the country’s leading taxpayers.
The other side of the tax system also benefited from a prosperous and highly
educated labor force. The increased administrative capacity necessary to assess
and collect income taxes rested heavily on an educated and trained government

46. See supra Chart 1. By 1920, U.S. real GDP per capita was approximately $5600 (in 1990
dollars), while U.K. levels were at about $4650, and Australia’s was just above $5000. MADDISON,
supra note 35, at 194–96.
47. Gallman, supra note 32, at 6.
48. Life expectancy among whites increased from forty-five years in 1870 to nearly sixty-one years
by 1930. The infant-mortality rate, defined as the number of infant deaths per 1,000 live births per
annum, declined from 175 among whites to 60 by 1870. Sumner J. La Croix, Government and the
People: Labor, Education, and Health, in GOVERNMENT & THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 323, 326–27
(2007).
49. HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES (Susan B. Carter et al. eds., 2006) 2-464 to
-468 tbl.Bc737–792. For more on the growing demand for high-school education during this period, see
generally Claudia Goldin, The Human-Capital Century and American Leadership: Virtues of the Past,
61 J. ECON. HIST. 263 (2001).
50. Robert W. Gordon, The American Legal Profession, 1870–2000, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE
HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA, at 73, 93 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008).
51. LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY 103 (2007); see also Julia C. Ott,
“The Free and Open People’s Market”: Political Ideology and Retail Brokerage at the New York Stock
Exchange, 1913–1933, 96 J. AM. HIST. 44 (2009).
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bureaucracy—the human capital of the public sector. The growth of the public
sector in the early twentieth century, particularly within the U.S. Treasury
Department, would become, as we shall see, vital to the development of an
effective income tax.52 The expansion of national administrative capacity was, in
turn, a function of complex historical forces. In this sense, American economic
progress certainly provided new tax “handles” and greater administrative
capacity for state authorities, but how such growth and government capacity
would be put to use was frequently a socially and politically contested issue.53
Ultimately, though, economic growth and development, by itself, was not
enough to provide the proper handles and capacity for the new income-tax
regime. Economic growth premised only on increased agricultural productivity
or an increasing number of small-scale merchants and artisans engaged in
numerous small, perhaps even barter, transactions would not have provided the
organizational or institutional framework for the development of an effective
income tax. What was even more critical than the increasing amount of national
income and output flowing through a national, regulated market was the
structural transformation in the American economy that accompanied modern
economic growth, namely the pronounced shift from agriculture to large-scale
manufacturing that was at the heart of modern American industrialization.
Moreover, by helping supplant household production and barter transactions
with a more liquid cash economy, modern industrialization facilitated the
measurement and collection of income taxes. The cash nexus provided a
medium of exchange and standardized equivalence that tax authorities could
accurately rely on to measure and assess income.54 Massive industrialization at
the turn of the twentieth century was also accompanied by seminal changes in
the size and scale of the organizational units of economic production and
distribution, and the attendant standardization of managerial and accounting
methods. These two institutional changes had a profound impact in shaping the
expansion of the modern income tax.
IV
MODERN AMERICAN INDUSTRIALIZATION AND THE ADVENT OF
MANAGERIAL CORPORATE CAPITALISM
During the antebellum period, particularly the 1840s and 1850s, the United
States reaped the benefits of early technological innovation and

52. See infra text accompanying notes 125–32.
53. For more on the political and social construction of bureaucratic public power during this
period, see generally DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY:
REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862–1928 (2001).
54. Gabriel Ardant, Financial Policy and Economic Infrastructure of Modern States and Nations, in
THE FORMATION OF NATIONAL STATES IN WESTERN EUROPE 164, 218 (Charles Tilly ed., 1975).
Although a cash economy had come to replace barter transactions in the United States much earlier
than the late nineteenth century, the pervasiveness of market transactions took on a new meaning with
the mass production and distribution of American industrialization.
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industrialization. But it was in the six decades or so that followed the Civil War
that technological advancements related to the second industrial revolution
profoundly transformed the size and structure of the U.S. economy.55 Impressive
technological improvements in transportation and communications linked a
continental nation and helped create a mass market for production and
distribution. Leading industrialists, like James Buchanan Duke, harnessed new
technologies to make the production process more efficient and to help increase
the national demand for consumer products. During the 1880s, Duke led his
company into the cigarette-manufacturing business by employing new cigaretterolling machines that significantly decreased the time and labor necessary to roll
cigarettes. He also used the nascent advertising industry and a new system of
merchandising to increase the consumer demand for his product. By 1890,
Duke dominated the cigarette market, consolidating the four leading cigarette
producing companies into the American Tobacco Company.56
As the railroads and telegraph system spread, large-scale integrated
industrial corporations, like the American Tobacco Company, emerged to take
advantage of the economies of scale provided by the new, high-volume
technologies. By combining the techniques of mass production and distribution
within single business entities, the colossal new industrial corporations ushered
in a new era of American capitalism. Accordingly, the industrial sector of the
economy quickly eclipsed the agricultural segment, and new forms of economic
organization and management paved the way for a more effective use of direct
and progressive taxes on personal and corporate incomes.
There was perhaps no greater evidence of the seismic shift in the economy
occasioned by industrialization than the changing sectoral composition of
economic output and employment. As late as 1879, agriculture accounted for
about half of the total value added in the economy’s commodity output; at that
same time, manufacturing was responsible for roughly a one-third share.57
Within two decades, the two sectors had completely reversed positions.
Manufacturing became the dominant segment of the economy by 1899, with a
53% share of output, while the agricultural proportion dropped to roughly onethird. And by 1929, the estimated divergence between the two leading
commodity-producing sectors had become even more pronounced.58

55. For a succinct summary of the numerous forces driving nineteenth-century American
industrialization, see generally Stanley L. Engerman & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Technology and
Industrialization, 1790–1914, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY, supra note 29, at 367.
56. ROBERT F. DURDEN, THE DUKES OF DURHAM, 1865–1929, Ch. 3 (1987); ROBERT L.
HEILBRONER & AARON SINGER, THE ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA 155 (1994).
57. Robert E. Gallman, Commodity Output, 1839–1899, in 24 THE CONFERENCE ON RESEARCH
IN INCOME AND WEALTH, TRENDS IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
(STUDIES IN INCOME AND WEALTH) 26 (1960) (All figures are in constant 1879 dollars.).
58. See Robert E. Gallman & Edward S. Howle, Trends in the Structure of the American Economy
Since 1840, in THE REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY 25, 26 (Robert W. Fogel
& Stanley L. Engerman eds., 1971); infra Table B.
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Table B
Sector Shares of Value Added in Commodity Production, 1879–192959

Agriculture
Industry
Mining
Manufacturing
Construction

1879
49

1889
37

1899
33

3
37
11

4
48
11

5
53
9

1909
26
74

1919
22
78

1929
17
83

The rise of late-nineteenth-century American industrial might was even
more evident when viewed from a comparative perspective. Focusing
specifically on industrial output, economic historians have shown how the last
decades of the nineteenth century were particularly critical for American
development. Whereas in 1880 the United States was fourth in terms of per
capita levels of industrial output (well behind the United Kingdom, Germany,
and Sweden), soon after 1900 the United States had surpassed the United
Kingdom to become the world leader.60 The growing U.S. share of world
industrial output similarly illustrates the rise of American manufacturing
leadership. Between 1880 and 1900, the United States supplanted the United
Kingdom as the world leader in terms of relative share of international
industrial output.61 Incidentally, those nation-states that industrialized earlier
were also the first to adopt direct taxes. The United Kingdom and Germany, for
instance, enacted income taxes well before the United States, suggesting that
some minimum level of economic growth and industrial concentration is
necessary for the viability of individual- and corporate-income taxes.62

59.
60.
61.
62.

Gallman & Howle, supra note 58, at 26.
Bairoch, supra note 43, at 294, 302; Wright, supra note 32, at 652.
Bairoch, supra note 43, at 296 tbl.10, 304 tbl.13; infra Chart 2.
MUSGRAVE, supra note 9, at 371–73.
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Chart 2. Relative Shares of World Industrial Output 1860–192863
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Historical changes in the distribution of U.S. employment mirrored the
sectoral shift in output and the comparative data on American industrial power.
Whereas more than half of all U.S. workers were farmers or farm laborers in
1870, that figure dropped to roughly one-fifth by 1930.64 Although the increase
in the share of manufacturing employment was not as pronounced, mainly
because of the changing census definition of manufacturing workers and
because of the productivity increases in output per worker, the gains were still
significant.65 In 1870, only about 19% of the labor force was dedicated to
manufacturing; by 1920 that figure had jumped to nearly 27%.66 The shift from
agricultural employment to manufacturing increased the number of wageearning workers with more-regular and precise incomes. Furthermore, because
farmers, especially subsistence farmers, were frequently difficult to tax, the
sectoral shift in employment from agriculture to manufacturing also aided the
effectiveness of tax collection.67
As more and more Americans became tied to the market for wage labor,
their salaries became susceptible to income taxes. To be sure, the vast majority
of ordinary workers were immune from the early-twentieth-century income tax.
In fact, political leaders and tax reformers consciously framed the modern
income tax as a levy mainly on the rich and affluent.68 As Congressman Cordell
Hull, one of the chief architects of the 1913 income tax explained, the central
goal of the progressive income tax was to ensure that “the wealth of the country
should bear its just share of the burden of taxation and that it should not be

63. Bairoch, supra note 43, at 296 tbl.10, 304 tbl.13.
64. Stanley Lebergott, Labor Force and Employment, 1800–1960, in OUTPUT, EMPLOYMENT AND
PRODUCTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES AFTER 1800, at 119 (1966).
65. ROBERT HIGGS, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY, 1865–1914, at 48–49
(1971).
66. Lebergott, supra note 64, at 119.
67. EDWARD D. ALLEN & O.H. BROWNLEE, ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC FINANCE 293 (1947).
68. Brownlee, supra note 29, at 1023.
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permitted to shirk that duty.”69 Still, industrialization not only drove workers
from rural farms to urban industries, it also created vast, though uneven,
amounts of wealth and facilitated the rise of a new managerial class of business
executives. These salaried executives and the new, highly integrated, industrial
enterprises they managed would soon become the leading sources of the early,
class-based income taxes.
Indeed, the modern industrial business corporation, administered by a
hierarchy of salaried professionals, was the hallmark of managerial corporate
capitalism. In earlier times, nearly all business firms were single-unit enterprises
owned and operated by a sole individual or small group of individuals who
responded to market prices and provided a solitary economic function—be it a
retail shop, factory, or bank—out of a lone location. Before the railroad and
telegraphic system became fully operational in the 1880s, these small firms
rarely competed with each other in a national market, nor did they have the
communication capabilities to manage and coordinate several scattered
operating units. Without a need for managerial supervision, these traditional,
often family-owned, companies combined the responsibilities of ownership and
control.70 Simply put, in these preindustrial businesses, “owners managed and
managers owned.”71
In stark contrast, the modern business enterprise, which was usually
organized as a corporation,72 was a large-scale firm with integrated multiple
units that performed a variety of economic activities across a vast area of
operations. The complex and numerous production and distribution activities of
these new firms were monitored and coordinated by a hierarchy of salaried
managers who generally had little equity stake in the businesses they operated.73
Unlike the swashbuckling captains of industry from an earlier generation, the
administrators of the modern business corporation were organizational men—
and they were nearly all men—dedicated to the long-run viability of their
business organizations. They were, in short, business bureaucrats.74
Modern business managers guided the expansion of their enterprises both
internally and through mergers and acquisitions. Indeed, between 1895 and
1904, in what is known as the “great merger movement,” manufacturing firms
consolidated at a remarkable, breakneck pace due to a confluence of historical

69. CORDELL HULL, THE MEMOIRS OF CORDELL HULL 58 (1948).
70. CHANDLER, supra note 12, at 1–12.
71. Id. at 9.
72. Though there were notable exceptions such as the Ford Motor Company which remained a sole
proprietorship well into the twentieth century, the vast majority of industrial enterprises were
organized as legal corporations. RICHARD S. TEDLOW, THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS
CORPORATION 5 (1991).
73. CHANDLER, supra note 12, at 7–10. The growing separation of ownership and control was, of
course, a great concern for corporate-law scholars and policymakers. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE,
JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
74. HEILBRONER & SINGER, supra note 56, at 77–85.

MEHROTRA

42

9/4/2010 11:12:25 AM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 73:25

factors.75 During that time, nearly two thousand companies combined with
former rivals to create some of the country’s largest industrial corporations.
Duke’s American Tobacco Company, for instance, embarked in the early 1890s
on a series of mergers and internal expansions that led it to control nearly 80%
of the entire tobacco industry.76 As a result, American Tobacco’s market
capitalization skyrocketed from $25 million in 1890 to approximately $500
million by 1904.77 Though the “visible hand of management”78 helped determine
the success of many mergers, the growth of financial intermediaries with
increasing access to international capital markets was equally important.
Whereas earlier transportation companies relied mainly on the issuance of
public and private debt, the great merger movement accelerated the
institutional convergence of American industrial manufacturing and finance
capital.79 Banks and other financial institutions prospered, and the ownership of
large corporate organizations became increasingly dispersed as the American
spirit of financial speculation and the ideology of a “shareholder democracy”
began to take hold.80
The emergence of large, integrated corporations is frequently depicted as a
functional response to the technological changes of modern industrialization, or
as an inevitable concomitant of economic growth. Their evolution, however,
was hardly natural or inexorable.81 Like all institutions, these new economic
organizations were populated by human agents who used resources and power
to further their beliefs and interests during historically specific moments.82 The
individuals, for example, who came to occupy the rungs of middle and upper
management at the leading American industrial corporations were, by and
large, members of an upper class imbued with economic and political authority.
Highly educated and frequently well connected, these business bureaucrats had
every incentive to perpetuate the power and prestige of a management
structure that was fast producing the next generation of business leaders.83

75. NAOMI R. LAMOREAUX, THE GREAT MERGER MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN BUSINESS, 1895–
1904, at 1 (1985). See generally ROBERT L. NELSON, MERGER MOVEMENTS IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY
1895–1956 (1959).
76. DURDEN, supra note 56, at 62.
77. Id. at 57; Thomas K. McCraw, Business & Government: The Origins of the Adversary
Relationship, 26 CAL. MGMT. REV. 33, 42 (1984).
78. WILLIAM G. ROY, SOCIALIZING CAPITAL 7 (1997).
79. Id. at 49–50.
80. See ROY, supra note 78, at 4. On the rise of financial speculation and the ideology of a so-called
“shareholder democracy,” see generally MITCHELL, supra note 51; Ott, supra note 51.
81. For a critique of the structural functionalism that underpins the Chandlerian account, see
generally ROY, supra note 78; Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984).
On more recent challenges to the economic description of the seemingly natural rise of the modern
corporation, see generally CONSTRUCTING CORPORATE AMERICA: HISTORY, POLITICS, CULTURE
(Kenneth Lipartito & David B. Sicilia eds., 2004).
82. James T. Kloppenburg, Institutionalism, Rational Choice and Historical Analysis, 28 POLITY
125 (1995).
83. HEILBRONER & SINGER, supra note 56, at 80–81.
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Likewise, the growth of the corporate form as a legal entity had its own
social and cultural history, one that exacerbated the defects of the existing
nineteenth-century U.S. tax system. On the one hand, the pervasiveness of large
corporations throughout American society helped establish the social
legitimacy of an economic organization in a political culture that was regularly
suspicious of concentrated power.84 Indeed, well before the economicproductivity gains of American industrialism took hold, corporations were
completing the cultural spade work that would ensure the existence of largescale businesses and hence the subsequent development of the income tax. In
the process, Big Business corporations were also playing an important role
through tax withholding and other reporting measures in educating and
socializing their dividend-receiving owners and their salaried managers about
the process of tax compliance.
On the other hand, the rise of corporate capitalism and the concomitant
increase in intangible wealth in the form of corporate securities placed greater
pressure on prevailing tax systems and provided social and political reformers
with an opportunity to advance income taxes as a substitute for the federal tariff
and subnational property taxes. The national tariff, which was no longer simply
protecting infant industries but seemed to be shielding domestic monopolies
from foreign competition, was blamed for fostering the creation of large
business combinations known as trusts.85 At the state and local level, the
inability of general property taxes to capture the wealth of large shareholders
animated agrarian populists and legal reformers who sought to use the income
tax as a viable alternative to property taxes.86 The drawbacks of the existing
framework of the American tax system combined with the economic changes
wrought by industrialism fueled the social and political calls for income
taxation. Thus, although industrialization and the rise of managerial corporate
capitalism were important influences on the creation and elaboration of the
modern income tax, the adoption of income taxes did not inescapably flow from
economic forces, but rather was conditioned by social and political power and
complex historical processes. Social and political variables, in other words, were
endogenously related to the economic factors shaping the modern income tax.
There were other modern forces related to industrialization that affected the
arrival of managerial capitalism—and subsequently the development of the
income tax—in various ways. Rapid urbanization, for instance, supported the
creation of mass production and distribution, and in turn indirectly expanded
the possibilities for new types of taxes. Between 1880 and 1910, the proportion
of Americans living in urban areas (defined as locations with more than 2,500

84. ALAN TRACHTENBERG, THE INCORPORATION OF AMERICA (1982); OLIVIER ZUNZ,
MAKING AMERICA CORPORATE, 1870–1920 (1992); J. WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE
BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780–1970 (1970).
85. See generally BYRON WEBBER HOLT, THE TARIFF: THE MOTHER OF TRUSTS (1899).
86. MORTON KELLER, REGULATING A NEW ECONOMY 210–20 (1990).
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persons) more than doubled, and the share of those living in large cities
(defined as locations with more than 100,000 persons) nearly quadrupled.87
The lure of factory jobs in mass-production processes certainly pulled
Americans into urban areas. The exodus from small rural communities to large
urban areas also led to the creation of a vast market of consumers who were
willing to purchase standard, mass-produced goods that were generally less
costly than the aesthetically specialized and individualized designs of craftsmen.
Ironically, the growth of the mass-consumption market provided opportunities
for the enactment of sales taxes. As large department stores and chain stores
began to eclipse the small-scale general country store,88 government tax
authorities could more easily assess consumption taxes, like a retail-sales tax.
Some state governments exploited this revenue stream during the early
twentieth century, beginning with levies on specific consumption items such as
cigarettes and gasoline.89
Over time, sales taxes became the prerogative of state governments. As
states and commonwealths came to rely on sales taxes as an increasingly
important source of revenue, they resisted federal encroachments on this tax
base. In the process, they staked out important ground in the ongoing
intergovernmental tension that was characteristic of the history of American
fiscal federalism. Indeed, the politics of fiscal federalism may explain in part
why subsequent attempts at adopting a federal sales tax were thwarted.90 Yet in
the early twentieth century the rise of a mass-consumption market suggests that
the development of the income tax was not preordained, that it was profoundly
shaped by social and political factors. Economic growth and urban
industrialization provided policymakers with multiple “tax handles”; but it was
mainly social crisis and political leadership particularly during the 1940s that
prevented the development of a national retail-sales tax and reinforced the
federal reliance on progressive income taxes.91
One reason why the federal sales tax did not gain sufficient currency among
lawmakers and policy analysts was because consumption levies had long been
assumed to be the most regressive of taxes, extracting revenue from those least
able to pay. Since the late nineteenth century, regressive taxes were associated
with a period of rising income and wealth inequality. The growing disparity of
wealth during the Gilded Age was also linked to the rise of corporate

87. HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 49, at 1-102 tbl.Aa684–698, 1-103 tbl.Aa699–715. See also
Mark Guglielmo & Werner Troesken, The Gilded Age, in GOVERNMENT & THE AMERICAN
ECONOMY 255, 275 (2007).
88. MANSEL G. BLACKFORD, A HISTORY OF SMALL BUSINESS IN AMERICA 64–66 (2003).
89. JON C. TEAFORD, THE RISE OF THE STATES: EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN STATE
GOVERNMENT 135–37 (2002).
90. ISAAC WILLIAM MARTIN, THE PERMANENT TAX REVOLT: HOW PROPERTY TAXES
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN POLITICS 79–80 (2008).
91. Lawrence Zelenak, The Federal Retail Sales Tax that Wasn’t: An Actual History and An
Alternative History, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (Winter 2010); see also STEVEN A. BANK, KIRK
J. STARK & JOSEPH J. THORNDIKE, WAR AND TAXES 93–95 (2008).
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capitalism. As a result, large, wealthy corporations became targets of populist
protests, and lawmakers began using tax policy as a cudgel to try to control the
growth of Big Business.92 Given the limited amount of statistical data on
nineteenth-century wealth and income, modern economic historians tend to
disagree about the extent of economic inequality in the late 1800s,93 but most
seem to concur that between the Civil War and the Great Depression a high
degree of income inequality reached an “uneven plateau,” whereby the share of
national income received by top income earners was consistent and peaked
during particular moments, including the eve of U.S. entry into World War I.94
The Great War itself had a tremendous leveling effect on income inequality,
due in no small part to the “soak the rich” tax laws of the period, but higher
levels of income disparity reappeared during the 1920s, reaching similar peaks
on the eve of the 1929 stock-market crash.95
Contemporary commentators were not oblivious to the growing disparity of
wealth. Writing in 1893, the federal statistician George K. Holmes used census
data to estimate that the richest 9% of American families owned about 70% of
national assets.96 The social consequences of such inequality seemed obvious.
“There is always the danger,” wrote Holmes, that the rich “will get too large a
hold upon the wealth, the resources, and the labor of the country,” in which
case “the most effective and practical remedies are progressive taxes on
incomes, gifts, and inheritances.” Holmes contended that it was only through
such political and legal measures that society could ensure “a distribution . . .
most conducive to social welfare.”97
Holmes’s remarks were emblematic of the era. Social commentators echoed
alarmist warnings about swollen fortunes, and these sociopolitical concerns
helped galvanize public support for the corporate tax and the Sixteenth
Amendment.98 The growing social anxiety and the calls for political and legal
reforms illustrate how economic factors were intertwined with other forces in
helping shape the adoption and expansion of the modern income tax.
Industrialization and the advent of managerial corporate capitalism provided

92. Avi-Yonah, supra note 6, at 1212–30; Kornhauser supra note 6, at 53–54.
93. Clayne Pope, Inequality in the Nineteenth Century, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES: THE LONG NINETEENTH CENTURY 109, 142 (Stanley L. Gallman & Robert
E. Engerman eds., 2000).
94. JEFFERY G. WILLIAMSON & PETER H. LINDERT, AMERICAN INEQUALITY: A
MACROECONOMIC HISTORY 75–79 (1980). The spread in pay rations between highly paid and low-paid
jobs parallels the income inequality seen in the share of income going to the top 1% of income
recipients. Id. at 80–92.
95. Id. See generally L. Soltow, Evidence on Income Inequality in the United States, 1866–1965, 29 J.
ECON. HIST. 279 (1969); R.S. Tucker, The Distribution of Income Among Income Taxpayers in the
United States, 1863–1935, 52 Q. J. ECON. 547 (1938).
96. George K. Holmes, The Concentration of Wealth, 8 POL. SCI. Q. 589, 592 (1893). Others
corroborated Holmes’ findings. CHARLES S. SPAHR, AN ESSAY ON THE PRESENT DISTRIBUTION OF
WEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES 55 (1896).
97. Holmes, supra note 96, at 599–600.
98. RATNER, supra note 19, at 254.
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the broader context, but historically specific social tensions and political actions
triggered fundamental changes to the institutional structure of American tax
law and policy. In this way, sociopolitical forces were bound up with broader
economic transformations.
V
ECONOMIC CHANGE AND THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE
MODERN INCOME TAX
Many of the economic changes wrought by the ascent of industrialization
and managerial corporate capitalism gradually had a profound impact on the
development of the modern income tax. Unsurprisingly, the concentration of
large-scale business enterprises had a direct influence on the elaboration of the
corporate-income tax. Not only was Big Business an easy political target for
populist reformers and progressive leaders, who could point to wealthy business
enterprises as potential sources of badly needed government revenue; these
large-scale industrial organizations also provided government tax authorities
significant administrative assistance. The consolidation of numerous, scattered,
specialized enterprises into fewer integrated, multi-unit big businesses eased the
administrative burden on corporate-tax collections.
It was not only the corporate-income tax, however, that benefited from the
rise of American Big Business; the individual-, or personal-, income tax also
prospered. The top managers and dispersed owners of the new corporate
behemoths became leading payers of the personal-income tax. In fact, over
time, professional salaries and dividend income became an increasingly
significant part of individual-income-tax revenues. In addition to helping create
the wealth and earnings that were susceptible to personal-income-tax laws, the
large industrial corporations were also pivotal intermediaries in the taxcollection process. In the early years of the corporate tax, they were remittance
vehicles for a corporate levy that was arguably aimed at shareholders. In later
years, when early and crude forms of income tax withholding were adopted and
the deliberate double taxation of corporate income took hold, these business
corporations became more-direct and purposeful collection agents for the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).
Yet the expansion of both the corporate- and individual-income tax may not
have been possible were it not for the systematic changes in the way modern
business enterprises precisely calculated their costs and revenues. Innovations
in accounting that emerged from the careful coordination of mass production
and distribution facilitated—inadvertently perhaps—the development of the
modern income tax by giving government organizations ample opportunities to
assess and collect corporate profits and personal incomes. It was this multitude
of economic changes ushered in by managerial corporate capitalism that helped
shape the institutional foundations of the modern income tax.
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A. Big Business and the Development of the Corporate-Income Tax
Even before the 1909 levy, business corporations had been among the
favorite tax targets of subnational lawmakers and policy analysts. The
nineteenth-century general property tax administered by state and local
governments gained much of its revenue from the property of local utilities and
street railways, as well as the tracks and property used by national railroads.
State and local governments also imposed gross-receipts taxes on businesses,
which accounted for a substantial amount of subnational revenue. In fact, in
several states such as California, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, corporate taxes
generated the majority of total annual tax receipts in the early twentieth
century.99
The increasing demand for public spending on education, hospitals, and
internal improvements drove the desire of state lawmakers to turn to business
corporations for greater tax revenue.100 An equally important component was
the anxiety created by the growing economic power of Big Business. Drawing
on a deep-seated antimonopoly tradition, agrarian populists feared that modern
business corporations were quickly eliminating the traditional way of life of
many yeoman farmers, relegating them to the dustbin of history. Likewise, local
merchants feared the concentration of monopoly power in the hands of
northeastern industrial elites. The taxation of large-scale modern corporations
was thus part of the overall American political preoccupation with using state
power to control the rise of corporate capitalism and the growing power of
economic elites.101
Indeed, American statecraft has long been distinguished by its antagonism
towards Big Business. As political and business historians have demonstrated,
the early arrival of American managerial corporate capitalism in the mid to late
1800s preceded, and in some ways compelled, the subsequent development of
the modern regulatory and administrative state. Consequently, a unique
American divide between private enterprise and public administration began to
develop.102 Although antitrust law is generally the policy arena that scholars

99. R. RUDY HIGGENS-EVENSON, PRICE OF PROGRESS 14, 80, 132–33 (2003).
100. Id. at 65.
101. On the antimonopoly ideas of populism, see generally GRETCHEN RITTER, GOLDBUGS AND
GREENBACKS (1999); LAWRENCE GOODWYN, THE POPULIST MOMENT (1978). On the small-business
resistance to industrial elites, see generally Richard Sylla, The Progressive Era and the Political
Economy of Big Government, 5 CRITICAL REV. 531 (1991); Charles W. McCurdy, American Law and
the Marketing Structure of the Large Corporation, 1875–1890, 38 J. ECON. HIST. 631, 637 (1978).
102. “Because two sets of administrative hierarchies grew at different periods of time for different
reasons to carry out different functions with different objectives, two quite different cultures
appeared,” explained Chandler in his classic essay. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Government Versus
Business: An American Phenomenon, in BUSINESS AND PUBLIC POLICY 4 (John Dunlop ed., 1980).
“The work, attitudes, and perspectives of the business manager and the civil servant became and
remained almost as distinct and separate as those of the humanist and the scientist.” Id. See generally
ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM (2001); DAVID VOGEL, KINDRED STRANGERS (1996);
REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE: HISTORICAL ESSAYS (Thomas K. McCraw ed., 1981); Morton J.
Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423 (1982).
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have explored to substantiate this claim,103 the tensions between American
government and Big Business can also be clearly seen in the evolution of U.S.
corporate-tax laws and policies.
During the political debates over the modern income tax, the proper
taxation of modern business corporations was a central concern. For lawmakers
drafting the 1894 income tax, the decision to impose a separate corporate-level
tax was a direct result of the social and political desires to punish large, abusive
corporations. “[T]he sentiment that in some way or another the Legislature
must get at the corporation,” explained one U.S. senator, “accounts for the tax
upon the incomes of corporations.” The prevailing “sentiment seems to be that
if a corporation does anything wrong, strike at all corporations, tax them.”104
Although most contemporary economic experts agreed that the incidence of
corporate taxes was relatively uncertain, the overwhelming perception of
corporate tax proponents was that it ultimately hit owners of capital, and not
labor or consumers. Similar attitudes drove the debates over the 1909 corporate
levy and the 1913 tax. And the objections to the new corporate taxes validated
that they were indeed perceived as punitive measures by the owners and
managers of large-scale business corporations who were nominally forced to
pay these levies.
Though the motivations behind the early corporate taxes may have been to
punish economic elites, these laws initially raised only moderate amounts of
revenue, at least until the economic, social, and political conditions surrounding
World War I dramatically transformed all aspects of American public finance.105
The 1909 corporate excise tax, for example, imposed only a flat, 1% levy on net
corporate income above $5,000.106 The 1913 income tax maintained a flat 1%,
but removed any exemption level.107 These measures raised some revenue, but it
was not until World War I, when new war and excess-profits taxes were added
to higher ordinary corporate-income taxes, that business corporations became
an integral part of the revenue-raising machinery. From 1916 through 1919,
Congress enacted a series of tax laws aimed at extracting revenue from those
industries and individuals who were believed to be profiting most from the war
effort. In 1918, during the peak of the wartime tax regime, profits and income
taxes on corporations generated roughly $3.1 billion out of total tax revenue of
about $4.3 billion, thus accounting for nearly three-quarters of total revenue.108

103. See generally Thomas K. McCraw, Rethinking the Trust Question, in REGULATION IN
PERSPECTIVE: HISTORICAL ESSAYS 1 (Thomas K. McCraw ed., 1981).
104. RICHARD J. JOSEPH, THE ORIGINS OF THE INCOME TAX 84 (2004) (quoting Senator Platt).
105. DAVID M. KENNEDY, OVER HERE: THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 112
(2004).
106. Corporation Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 61-5, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112 (1909).
107. Tariff of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, § 2, 38 Stat. 114, 166 (1913). Because the Sixteenth
Amendment had obviated the need for framing the levy as an excise tax, the 1913 tax was expressly
imposed as a levy on net corporate income.
108. U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE, STATISTICS OF INCOME,
COMPILED FROM THE RETURNS FOR 1925, at 23 (1927).
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What is even more significant than the revenue eventually raised by
corporate taxes is the type of business firms that were remitting the early levies.
The large-scale industrial corporations that had ushered in a new era of
managerial capitalism soon became the largest sources of corporate-income and
profits taxes, especially during World War I. Corporations classified by the BIR
as part of “manufacturing and mechanical industries” accounted for nearly half
of all corporate-income-tax revenue, and about a quarter of overall tax revenue
in 1916.109 By 1918, manufacturing was responsible for nearly half of all total tax
revenue, accounting for $2.1 billion of the total $4.2 billion raised by both
corporate and personal taxes.110
Table C
Leading Sources of Early Corporate Tax Revenue, by Industry, 1916–1930
(nominal dollars in thousands and as percentage of total tax revenue)111
Manufacturing

1916
$ 81,260

24%

1920
$ 944,960

35%

1925
$ 546,740

29%

1930
$ 316,991

27%

Transportation
and Public Utilities

$ 30,160

9%

$ 98,623

4%

$ 186,313

10%

$ 156,573

13%

Finance, Banking,
Insurance, etc.

$ 10,505

3%

$ 119,001

4%

$ 179,948

9%

$ 109,455

9%

$ 192,612

7%

$ 145,349

8%

$ 64,165

5%

$ 174,595

6%

$ 55,048

3%

$ 21,474

2%

Trade
Mining

$ 15,846

5%

A closer analysis of corporate-tax revenues by leading industries during the
early years of income taxation suggests that Big Business remained a significant
source of tax revenue, even as war and excess-profits levies were repealed in the
1920s. Despite the paucity of systematic data, and the shifting definition of BIR
categories over time, the salience of large industrial corporations to overall tax
revenue is unmistakable. Manufacturing, transportation and public utilities,
financial institutions, and trade were all leading sources of corporate-tax
revenue from World War I to the onset of the Great Depression. Notably, while
manufacturing firms were the leading source of corporate revenue throughout

109. U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE, STATISTICS OF INCOME,
COMPILED FROM THE RETURNS FOR 1916, at 12 (1918); infra Table C.
110. U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE, STATISTICS OF INCOME,
COMPILED FROM THE RETURNS FOR 1918 at 14, 19 (1921).
111. U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE, STATISTICS OF INCOME
COMPILED FROM THE RETURNS FOR 1916 (1918); TREASURY DEPARTMENT, U.S. INTERNAL
REVENUE, STATISTICS OF INCOME COMPILED FROM THE RETURNS FOR 1918 (1921); TREASURY
DEPARTMENT, U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE, STATISTICS OF INCOME FROM RETURNS OF NET INCOME
FOR 1920 (1922); TREASURY DEPARTMENT, U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE, STATISTICS OF INCOME FROM
RETURNS OF NET INCOME FOR 1925 (1927); TREASURY DEPARTMENT, U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE,
STATISTICS OF INCOME FROM RETURNS OF NET INCOME FOR 1930 (1932).
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this period, the apparent rise of financial intermediation and the relative decline
of mining are also apparent from the data.112
As large-scale industrial corporations became increasingly significant
sources of total tax revenue, the highly integrated aspects of these corporate
enterprises also seemed to ease the administrative burden on tax authorities. In
the process of creating and expanding integrated and highly efficient business
organizations, corporate business managers were also providing government tax
authorities with a single site for an enormous amount of income-tax
information. Measuring and reaching the income of millions of small merchants
or scattered artisans was much more administratively challenging than tapping a
small number of large, integrated manufacturers. The economies of scale that
were driving mass production and distribution were, in short, facilitating
income-tax collections.
With an increasing proportion of income and output moving through larger
units of production and distribution, tax collection could become more
centralized. Instead of trying to get handles on a large number of small and
dispersed producers of goods, the BIR could focus its energies, as it did, on the
concentrated regions of the country where many of the large-scale industrial
corporations were situated.113 At the same time, the BIR itself seemed to
become more business-like in its efficient collection of revenue, especially
during the World War I period, when a dramatic increase in administrative
capacity and improvements substantially decreased the costs of tax collection.
According to BIR statistics, the average cost of collection declined steadily
from a high of over two dollars for every hundred dollars collected in 1909 to
roughly thirty cents by 1918.114 Though there were likely several reasons for this
steep increase in collection efficiency, including the World War I Treasury
Department’s efforts to access a traditional reservoir of patriotism and civic
voluntarism,115 the scale economies of taxing large, integrated corporations with
a newly reorganized and well-trained BIR were likely part of the reason.

112. See supra Table C.
113. SEC’TY OF THE TREASURY DEP’T, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
ON THE STATE OF THE FINANCES FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1910, at 452 (1911). There are,
of course, limits to the notion that the concentration of businesses facilitates tax collection. In the
extreme case, if there were just one large business, tax collection would suffer from the lack of
information collected through business to business transactions.
114. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 21, at 555.
115. For a general assessment of civic voluntarism during World War I, see generally CHRISTOPHER
CAPOZZOLA, UNCLE SAM WANTS YOU (2008); on the ways that the World War I Treasury tapped
wartime patriotism and civic voluntarism for the payment of income taxes, see generally Ajay K.
Mehrotra, Lawyers, Guns & Public Monies: The U.S. Treasury, World War One, and the Administration
of the Modern Fiscal State, 28 L. & HIST. REV. 173 (2010).
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B. Managerial Corporate Capitalism and the Development of the PersonalIncome Tax
It was not only as sources of corporate-income taxes and as concentrated
collection sites that large industrial enterprises contributed to the elaboration of
the income tax; they also influenced the development of personal-income taxes
in similar ways. First, the great wealth created by these large economic
organizations was distributed to two main groups that were the leading sources
of personal-income-tax revenue: the highly paid top executives who were
managing these new large-scale business enterprises and the corporate
stockholders who were collecting handsome dividends and investment profits
from their ownership of these firms. Second, the new business enterprises were
also pivotal intermediaries in the process of collecting individual-income taxes.
During the early phases of corporate taxation, when it seemed unclear whether
corporate taxes were aimed at business corporations as separate entities or were
simply proxies for an income tax on shareholders, large-scale business
enterprises played a critical role in helping to collect income taxes.116 And when
early and crude forms of personal-income-tax withholding were adopted,
corporations remained vital remittance vehicles for individual income taxes.
Although the process of tax withholding changed over time, this aspect of the
rise of managerial corporate capitalism may have had the greatest long-term
impact on the effective administration of the modern U.S. income tax.
Like the corporate tax, the early personal-income tax began with relatively
modest rates and high-exemption levels, but it too was radically altered by the
World War I fiscal revolution. The 1913 income tax, for example, exempted
incomes under $3000 ($4000 for married couples), and imposed a “normal” rate
of 1% on all income up to $20,000, after which graduated “surtax” rates
reaching a peak of 6% for income over $5 million were applied.117 According to
modern estimates, only about 2% of American households were affected by the
1913 income tax, and the average tax rate for top earners was only 6%.118 World
War I, of course, forever altered the fiscal landscape. Beginning with the
Revenue Act of 1916, Congress lowered exemption levels and dramatically
increased rates.119 At the height of the World War I tax regime, the exemption
level dropped to $1000 ($2000 for married couples), normal rates soared to 6%
for the first $4,000 of income above exemption levels and 12% for all income
beyond $4,000, and surtax rates skyrocketed to a top rate of 65%.120 Nearly one
in five American households paid some income tax, and the effective rate on

116. On the multiple motivations behind the early corporate tax, see generally Avi-Yonah, supra
note 6; Bank, supra note 6; Kornhauser, supra note 6.
117. Tariff of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, § 2, 38 Stat. 114, 166 (1913).
118. BROWNLEE, supra note 20, at 46; HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 49, at 5-114 to -115
tbl.Ea758–72.
119. On the importance of the 1916 Act, see generally W. Elliot Brownlee, Wilson and Financing the
Modern State: The Revenue Act of 1916, 129 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 173 (1985).
120. Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 216, 40 Stat. 1057, 1069 (1918).
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top income earners (those earning more than $1 million) reached a high of
65%.121
Over time, as managerial corporate capitalism spread and exemption levels
declined, the sources of personal income reflected the growing importance of
the elite business class. Modern historians have estimated that for the early
income tax, this amorphous group of “[b]usinessmen . . . accounted for about
eighty-five percent of the income reported, and almost ninety percent of the tax
paid.”122 Contemporary estimates of the average annual salaries of business
executives further suggest that top corporate managers fell well within the early
web of income taxes. According to a 1925 study of pre–World War I salaries,
average yearly executive salaries for the largest firms (those with capital over
$1.5 million) was roughly $10,000, well beyond the $4,000 exemption level for
married couples.123 The average annual salaries of top managers at smaller firms
also frequently fell within the existing income-tax brackets.124 To be sure, the
total number of top managers paying income taxes was not large enough to
sustain the revenue needs of a modern nation-state.125 Still, a more careful
examination of data from income-tax returns over time corroborates that
salaries were becoming an increasingly larger source of individual income.
Whereas salaries accounted for less than 20% of total personal-income-tax
revenue in 1916, by the end of the war, salaries generated nearly 60% of
individual-income-tax receipts.126 Although this figure declined during the postwar fiscal retrenchment, salaries remained the leading source of personalincome-tax revenue throughout the rest of the twentieth century.127

121. HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 49, at 5-113 tbl.Ea748–757; U.S. TREASURY
DEPARTMENT, U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE, STATISTICS OF INCOME, COMPILED FROM THE RETURNS
FOR 1920, at 21 (1920); W. Elliot Brownlee, Historical Perspective on U.S. Tax Policy Toward the Rich,
in DOES ATLAS SHRUG? 29 (Joel Slemrod ed., 2000).
122. BUENKER, supra note 4, at 14.
123. F.W. Taussig & W.S. Baker, American Corporations and their Executives: A Statistical Inquiry,
40 Q. J. ECON. 4, 19 (1925).
124. Id. The average wage earner, of course, made much less, earning about a total of $1,400 on an
annual basis. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
347 (1930).
125. In fact, only about 226,000 American households with income over $10,000 actually filed
income taxes in 1920, but this group accounted for more than 75% of total individual income-tax
revenue in that year. U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE, STATISTICS OF
INCOME, COMPILED FROM THE RETURNS FOR 1920, at 4–5 (1920).
126. See infra Table D.
127. Indeed, in 1998, salaries and wages accounted for nearly 72% of total adjusted gross income.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES (1998).
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Table D
Leading Sources of Early Personal-Income Tax, 1916–1930
(nominal dollars in thousands and as percentage of total tax revenue)128
1916

1920

1925

1930

Salaries

$ 1,478,346

18%

$15,270,373

57%

$9,742,159

39%

$ 9,921,952

44%

Business*

$ 2,637,474

32%

$ 5,927,327

22%

$3,688,804

15%

$ 2,628,056

12%

Dividends

$ 2,136,468

26%

$ 2,735,845

10%

$3,464,624

14%

$ 4,197,303

19%

$1,814,402

7%

$ 1,940,437

9%

Interest and
Investments
Total Income

—
$ 8,349,901

—
$26,690,269

$25,272,034

$22,412,445

* Personal income from business refers to income from sole proprietorships.

As industrial corporations began to tap capital markets more aggressively in
the early twentieth century, dividends and gains from investments also became
an important source of personal income. Because the definition of investment
profits, or capital gains, varied during the early years of the income tax, there is
little consistent data on this income-tax revenue stream. Nonetheless, the early
decades of the twentieth century witnessed the increasingly widespread
dispersion of corporate-stock ownership.129 It was also a time when industrial
firms, like Bethlehem Steel and U.S. Steel, began using stock-bonus plans to
reward top managers.130 As a speculation economy and an ideology of
“shareholder democracy” took hold, more and more Americans began to
identify themselves as stockholders.131 Indeed, the distribution of stock
ownership among the middle class seemed to increase dramatically.132
Accordingly, dividends made up a growing amount, if not a growing percentage,
of total personal income in this period. In the aggregate, dividends, salaries, and

128. U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE, STATISTICS OF INCOME
COMPILED FROM THE RETURNS FOR 1916 (1918); TREASURY DEPARTMENT, U.S. INTERNAL
REVENUE, STATISTICS OF INCOME COMPILED FROM THE RETURNS FOR 1918 (1921); TREASURY
DEPARTMENT, U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE, STATISTICS OF INCOME FROM RETURNS OF NET INCOME
FOR 1920 (1922); TREASURY DEPARTMENT, U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE, STATISTICS OF INCOME FROM
RETURNS OF NET INCOME FOR 1925 (1927); TREASURY DEPARTMENT, U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE,
STATISTICS OF INCOME FROM RETURNS OF NET INCOME FOR 1930 (1932).
129. H.T. Warshow, The Distribution of Corporate Ownership in the United States, 30 Q. J. ECON.
15, 15–17 (1924).
130. Harwell Wells, “No Man Can be Worth $1,000,000 A Year”: The Fight Over Executive
Compensation in 1930s America, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1462791.
131. MITCHELL, supra note 51, at 197–205; David Hochfelder, “Where the Common People Could
Speculate”: The Ticker, Bucket Shops, and the Origins of Popular Participation in Financial Markets,
1880–1920, 93 J. AM. HIST. 335, 336 (2006); Ott, supra note 51, at 44. Estimates suggest that although
only about 3% of U.S. households owned stock before World War I, by the end of the 1920s that
figured had jumped to nearly 25%. Ott, supra note 51, at 45.
132. By 1923, more than half of all dividends paid went to people with incomes below $20,000.
MITCHELL, supra note 51, at 103 (citing to H.T. Warshow, The Distribution of Corporate Ownership in
the United States, 30 Q. J. ECON. 15 (1924)).
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noncorporate business income accounted for a tremendous amount of personalincome-tax revenue. As a group these three categories generated more than
three-quarters of total individual-income-tax receipts in 1916, nearly 90% in
1920, and roughly two-thirds of income-tax revenue throughout the 1920s.133
One of the reasons why dividends and salaries became such a significant
part of early personal-tax revenue was because of the key intermediary position
of corporations in the tax-collection process. In the early years of the corporate
tax, before the deliberate double taxation of corporate income, large business
corporations served as vital collection devices for taxes that were arguably
aimed at shareholders. Because the prevailing national tariffs and the
dysfunctional subnational property tax did not reach the intangible wealth held
by owners of business corporations, namely their investments in corporate
securities, the pre–World War I corporate taxes could be seen as proxies for an
income tax on shareholders, as some scholars have claimed.134 If that was the
case, corporations were in a sense deputized as quasi-collection agents for the
BIR. Even in subsequent decades, after the double taxation of corporate
income became a conscious part of American tax policy, corporations would
continue to be important remittance agents in the tax-collection process.
Beginning with the 1913 income tax, a crude yet comprehensive form of
withholding was used to ease the administrative burden on individual-incometax collections. Since large, integrated corporations were already using careful
bookkeeping techniques to calculate precisely employment costs and dividend
payouts, the federal government could easily exploit this information source
and require corporations to withhold the tax payments on salaries and
dividends.
The U.S. experiment with withholding had begun, haltingly, with the Civil
War income taxes. Borrowing the concept from the British, the Union used a
“stoppage at the source” method of tax collection that was limited to
government salaries, corporate dividends from railroads, and interest from
financial institutions.135 Even at this early stage, lawmakers recognized that
large-scale, integrated corporations could be effective remittance vehicles. As
one tax commentator succinctly explained, “[I]t was much easier to collect from
the corporations than from the individual stockholders and bondholders.”136
And as corporations became bigger and more consolidated, this principle
became even more evident.
Whereas the Civil War income tax had made limited use of withholding, the
1913 income tax imposed a more comprehensive method of what was referred
to as “collection at the source.”137 The law provided that whenever a corporation

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See supra Table D.
See generally Bank, supra note 6.
Tax Act of 1862, ch. 119, §§ 81, 82, 86, 12 Stat. 432 (1862).
Joseph A. Hill, The Civil War Income Tax, 8 Q. J. ECON. 416, 427 (1894).
BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 21, at 79.
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or individual paid out interest or dividends of any amount, or rent, premiums,
wages, or salaries in excess of $3000, they were required not only to provide this
information to the BIR, they also had to withhold the normal tax of 1% and pay
it to the BIR on behalf of the payee.138 By 1913, dramatic changes in the size and
structure of the American economy made the use of withholding via
corporations and other intermediaries even more effective than during the Civil
War. The arrival of urban–industrial capitalism not only increased the
proportion of workers that were salaried employees, but the early convergence
of large-scale manufacturing and finance capital also increased the amount of
dividends and interest that were being paid out.
Although, in theory, collection at the source could be highly efficient and
even popular with taxpayers, the increasing complexity of tax laws led the
Treasury Department to move from a system of “withholding at the source” to
a method of collecting “information at the source.”139 The potential intricacies of
the law became especially acute when the World War I tax regime imposed
steeply progressive surtax rates. Lawmakers reasoned that a corporation could
be a fairly reliable withholding agent when there was a flat normal rate that
applied to all salaries and dividends, but that there was much greater
uncertainty about the proper rate of taxation when there might be other sources
of income besides salaries and dividends. Because of this reasoning and because
collection at the source, which applied only to normal (as opposed to surtax)
rates, was capturing only a small percentage of total tax revenue, Congress
altered the withholding system during the war by replacing “collection at the
source” with “information at the source” for nearly all taxpayers. Thereafter,
corporations and other intermediaries provided detailed information about
dividends, salaries, and other similarly situated fixed payments, but no longer
collected the tax on these payments.140
The advent of social security in the late 1930s reintroduced Americans to a
type of withholding, though it was limited to earmarked payroll taxes.141 This
experience with automatic payroll deductions would prove to be critical for
policymakers and taxpayers alike, as the process of income-tax withholding
developed over time.142 The more general procedure of withholding income
taxes at the source did not return until the mid-1940s, when the turn to a mass
tax compelled the government to reach out to a much greater swath of
Americans.143 Although some libertarian scholars have bemoaned how the

138. Tariff of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, § 2, 38 Stat. 114, 166 (1913); BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note
21, at 79.
139. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ON THE STATE OF THE FINANCES
FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1918 (1919), at 942–44.
140. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 21, at 519–20.
141. THEDA SKOCPOL, THE MISSING MIDDLE: WORKING FAMILIES AND THE FUTURE OF
AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY 42 (2001).
142. Brownlee, supra note 20, at 94–95.
143. George E. Lent, Collection of the Personal Income Tax at the Source, 50 J. POL. ECON. 719,
723–24 (1942).
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advent of withholding has insidiously facilitated the growth of big government,144
the development of withholding at the source may be one of the greatest
legacies of the early income-tax laws. Modern lawmakers, for example, have
celebrated withholding as “the cornerstone of the administration of our
individual income tax.”145 And tax-law scholars and public-finance economists
have come to agree that the process of third-party remittance is an essential
feature of modern income-tax compliance.146 It is no mere coincidence that the
earliest forms of withholding began during the early twentieth century, for it
was then that lawmakers could more easily turn to the burgeoning industrial
corporations for assistance in remitting personal-income-tax revenue.
C. Corporate Accounting and the Modern Income Tax
In many ways, the development of tax withholding and information
reporting would not have been possible without an even more fundamental
change ushered in by the arrival of managerial corporate capitalism: the
consolidation of innovate accounting methods. Modern business corporations,
like modern tax collection, thrived on accurate information. To do their jobs,
corporate executives needed and craved precise and systematic quantitative
information about the everyday operations of their enterprises.147 In earlier
periods, small-scale merchants could likely get by with ad hoc accounts of
separate parts of their business transactions. During the rise of industrialism,
however, high capital costs, the compelling demands of scientific management,
and a new class of investors drove managers of modern industrial corporations
to develop more-sophisticated forms of financial, capital, and cost accounting.148

144. MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE D. FRIEDMAN, TWO LUCKY PEOPLE: MEMOIRS 122–23 (1998).
See generally Charlotte Twight, Evolution of Federal Income Tax Withholding: The Machinery of
Institutional Change, 14 CATO J. 359, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj14n3/cj14n3-1.pdf.
For more on how tax visibility and fiscal consciousness cuts across political affiliation, see generally
Joseph J. Thorndike, Historical Perspective: What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You, Apr. 21, 2005,
available at http://www.taxhistory.org/thp/readings.nsf/ArtWeb/60CCA25AAE80903885256FF6006
EA59D?OpenDocument.
145. User Fees and Withholding Taxes on Interest and Dividends, Before the Task Force on Tax
Policy of the Comm. on the Budget, 97th Cong. 162, 165 (1982).
146. Piroska Soos, Self-Employed Evasion and Tax Withholding: A Comparative Study and Analysis
of the Issues, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 107, 121 (1990). See generally Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed
Bumps: The Role that Third Parties Play in Tax Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695 (2007); Joel
Slemrod, Does It Matter Who Writes the Check to the Government? The Economics of Tax Remittance,
61 NAT. TAX J. 251 (2008). Indeed, scholars have recently estimated that modern businesses (not just
corporations) overall have “paid, collected, and remitted” nearly 84% of total taxes at all levels of
government. Kevin Christensen, Robert Cline & Tom Neubig, Total Corporate Taxation: ‘Hidden,’
Above-the-Line, Non-Income Taxes, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 495, 497–98 (2001).
147. On the importance of accurate information to the growth of large industrial corporations, see
generally MARGARET LEVENSTEIN, ACCOUNTING FOR GROWTH (1998).
148. H. Thomas Johnson, Management Accounting in an Early Integrated Industrial: E.I. DuPont de
Nemours Powder Company, 1903–1912, 49 BUS. HIST. REV. 184 (1975). For more on the history of
American accounting, see generally PAUL J. MIRANTI, JR., ACCOUNTANCY COMES OF AGE (1990).
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As with so many other areas of management innovation, the midnineteenth-century railroads led the way in centralizing and standardizing
financial information and accounts.149 Other industrial concerns, such as steel
companies, soon followed suit, and by the early twentieth century, leading
manufacturers like Du Pont pioneered some of the most precise and
consolidated types of accounting practices.150 Although business managers
initially created new accounting methods to exploit the scale economies of mass
production and distribution, these innovations facilitated—inadvertently
perhaps—the development of the modern income tax by giving government
organizations ample opportunities to assess and collect corporate profits and
personal incomes.
Among the many management innovations initiated by Du Pont, the
consolidation of cost, capital, and financial accounting proved highly beneficial
to tax collection. In combining these areas of recordkeeping, Du Pont focused
carefully on overhead costs, which included indirect costs such as salaries, and
direct material costs like tax liability. These figures, unsurprisingly, were a boon
to tax collection. Similarly, the new focus on capital accounting—that is on the
rate of return on invested capital—allowed Du Pont officials to evaluate and
plan their use of fixed and working capital. Though this information was
provided mainly for the use of the company’s executive committee, over time it
would also became a useful resource for assessing tax liability.151
There were, to be sure, precedents for the federal exploitation of corporate
accounting. Throughout the nineteenth century, industrial enterprises—like
railroads—were, for example, liable for state and local property taxes and, on
occasion, even for state taxes on gross receipts.152 Thus, company auditors and
financial experts needed to account for an enterprise’s regular state and local
tax liabilities. Public utilities also came under the regulatory powers of
subnational governments, and, as part of their rate-monitoring functions, street
railways and sewer and gas companies were required to share financial
information regularly with state and local regulators.153 Though many regulated
and taxed businesses often exercised their political power to evade regulatory
rules, and to avoid or delay their state and local tax payments, these companies
could not claim that they did not have an accurate account of their regular
financial performance. In fact, railroads employed small armies of accountants
and auditors, probably more than the federal or any state government.154 Over
time, government officials at all levels began using the financial information
intended for managers, directors, and investors to facilitate the process of tax
collection.
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At the federal level, the advanced accounting for salaries and dividends was
particularly useful for the development of the individual income tax. Modern
business corporations employed hundreds of thousands of professional, salaried
managers. Monitoring the payment of salaries to these employees was an
important part of calculating the expenses of the growing industrial enterprises.
The salary information not only helped companies keep track of labor costs, it
also provided government tax authorities with a platform from which to tax
these salaries as part of the early personal-income tax. Similarly, as the
separation of ownership and control of large corporations became more
pronounced, and as financial intermediaries began to play a more prominent
role in underwriting business expansion, accurate measures of return on
investment and dividend yields became increasingly significant. Here too,
government tax authorities found new tax handles to tap dividends and capital
gains as personal income from property.
The rise of a fledgling accounting profession during this time period also
supported the links between systematic recordkeeping and tax collection. The
early income-tax laws, to be sure, increased the demand for accounting services,
which required professional accountants to patrol the borders between trained
experts and unqualified amateurs.155 Yet, the true significance of the accounting
profession for tax collection in the early years of the income tax came from the
profession’s identity that it was operating as independent, objective, and fair
arbitrators between taxpayers and the government. Edwin L. Suffern, the 1912
president of the American Association of Public Accountants, reminded his
colleagues that professional accountants had a responsibility in providing the
accurate financial information that could benefit all interested parties, including
the state.156 Over time, as the tax burden on businesses and individuals
increased, the growing demand for accountants and lawyers and the increasing
competition to provide tax services eroded this ethos of objective
independence. Consequently, tax accountants increasingly became advocates
for their clients rather than neutral arbitrators.
Corporate managers—and their auditors and lawyers—may not have
intended their rational and routinized accounting methods to be used by tax
authorities, but once the institutional foundations were firmly in place, a
virtuous feedback cycle seemed to emerge whereby new tax laws would
reinforce accurate business accounting. This type of symbiosis was apparent at
the subnational level during the turn of the century, though in the other
direction. Government research bureaus, like the New York Bureau of
Municipal Research, were not only relying on corporate data, but also adopting
“business methods” such as executive budgets and centralized accounting.157 By

155. GARY JOHN PREVITS & BARBARA DUBIS MERIO, A HISTORY OF ACCOUNTANCY IN THE
UNITED STATES: THE CULTURAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ACCOUNTING 182 (1998).
156. Id. at 254–55.
157. HIGGENS-EVENSON, supra note 99, at 101.
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the early decades of the twentieth century, the feedback mechanism was also
working in the opposite direction, for the activist tax state was shaping the
accounting practices of corporations. One way this was occurring was through
the stiff reporting requirements that accompanied the early income-tax laws.
The 1909 corporate tax, for instance, required all business corporations to file
detailed returns listing not only gross income but all permissible deductions,
including operating expenses, interest on debt, other taxes paid, and losses not
covered by insurance. Returns were due on March 1st, and fines were imposed
for late filing, for fraudulent returns, and for not filing at all. And, perhaps most
important, returns were initially deemed to be public records and thus open to
inspection.158 Although business interests complained vehemently about the
reporting requirements, especially the potential for full disclosure,159 the
hierarchically managed modern business corporation seemed to be well suited
to take on the new tax reporting requirements. One of the great achievements
of managerialism, after all, was its ability to calculate precisely the costs and
profits from mass production and distribution.
The U.S. Treasury Department was highly cognizant of how tax laws could
foster greater systematic tax information. During the Great War, federal tax
officials claimed that the income-tax laws, and especially the newly complex war
and excess-profits taxes, were forcing businesses to reform their accounting
practices. “Businessmen were deriving one inestimable benefit from the new tax
law,” Daniel C. Roper, the wartime Commissioner of Internal Revenue, later
recounted. “Complicated and technical as were the minutiae, they were learning
how to keep accurate records of profit and loss.”160 Roper was surely
exaggerating the power and influence of the World War I tax regime, but he
accurately identified how the modern income tax was perpetuating its own
existence by helping reinforce its institutional foundations.
VI
CONCLUSION
It has been roughly a century since the 1909 corporate tax and the Sixteenth
Amendment together helped pave the way for the elaboration of the modern
income tax. Yet, even before the corporate levy was enacted or the
constitutional amendment was ratified, more-fundamental economic and
material changes were already laying the critical groundwork for the
subsequent development of direct and progressive taxes. Well before the first
permanent national income tax was adopted in 1913, a unique array of
technological innovations and resource-based circumstances were fueling
American economic growth and helping propel the United States into a world

158. Corporation Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 61-5, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112–13 (1909). On the rise and fall of
the disclosure requirements linked to the 1909 corporate tax, see Kornhauser, supra note 6, at 69.
159. Kornhauser, supra note 6, at 115–16.
160. DANIEL C. ROPER, FIFTY YEARS OF PUBLIC LIFE 181 (1969).
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industrial power. The income tax benefited enormously from these economic
transformations. As an increasing amount of economic output and income
moved through the formal channels of a regulated national market, government
authorities seized new opportunities to assess and collect income taxes.
There was perhaps no greater facilitator of the expansion of markets and the
adoption of income taxes than the modern, large-scale industrial corporation.
These highly integrated business enterprises helped create the corporate and
individual wealth that would soon become a central source of income-tax
revenues. The big businesses themselves became significant sources of
corporate income, just as salaried, professional managers and dividendreceiving stockholders became important sources of personal-income-tax
revenue. As these modern business enterprises became more integrated and
concentrated, they also provided vital administrative assistance to the collection
of income taxes. The concentration of capital and labor in these new
organizational units provided government authorities with convenient “tax
handles” to identify and gather both corporate and individual income taxes.
Likewise, the systematic record-keeping and accounting that helped to foster
the rise of managerial corporate capitalism also provided government agencies
with crucial tax information. The U.S. Treasury exploited this access to
information with its own innovations, including early, crude types of
withholding, which lowered the costs of tax collection. New and more-complex
tax laws, in turn, reinforced the rational bookkeeping that was at the heart of
industrial capitalism and that helped facilitate income-tax compliance.
The establishment of modern tax institutions that accompanied economic
growth and the emergence of the modern business corporation did not occur
easily or quickly; these institutions were part of a broader, contested process of
change, frequently accelerated by national emergencies such as the two world
wars. In some cases, the evolution was episodic. The institution of tax
withholding, for example, had limited initial success, and was even replaced
during the pivotal World War I era when business interests convinced U.S.
Treasury officials that steeply progressive rates were incompatible with incometax collection at the source. Tax withholding returned, however, during the
Second World War, and, by the end of the twentieth century, it became one of
the most important aspects of effective tax compliance. In other cases,
institutional achievements were more fleeting. Corporate taxes as a source of
total tax revenue grew during the first half of the century, peaking in 1943, but
since then they have diminished rapidly. In still other situations, the
development of tax institutions has been more promising. Corporations as
remittance devices—not only in withholding employee salaries but also for
information about dividends and other sources of individual income—have
remained critical to the effective functioning of a quasi-voluntary system of tax
compliance. Although social crisis and political will have been vital to the
development of these important tax institutions, many of them may not have
been possible without the antecedent material conditions provided by
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American economic growth and the advent of modern managerial corporate
capitalism.

